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I. INTRODUCTION
Standard form contracts are part of the reality of modern commercial
existence.' Businesses and merchants use these contracts as a matter of effi-
ciency and risk-reduction, utilizing their superior bargaining power to impose
the terms contained within on a "take it or leave it" basis to their customers.2
Consumers accept these contracts for a number of reasons. They don't want to
take the time to read the form contract language because: they don't think it will
impact their individual circumstances, they don't really understand the meaning
of the contract clauses, they don't think they could bargain with the merchant
and successfully change the terms even if they did understand them, and they
Professor, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. I would like to thank Texas Wes-
leyan University School of Law for its generous research assistance provided for this Article. I
would also like to thank my Texas Wesleyan colleagues for their input on this paper at an infor-
mal works-in-progress presentation on September 23, 2009, including Brian Holland, Wade Sa-
voy, Maxine Harrington, Malinda Seymore, Huyen Pham, Michael Green, James McGrath, Mark
Burge, Meg Penrose, Stephen Alton, and Tim Mulvaney. Thanks to Kate Echols for student re-
search assistance. Finally, special thanks to Sheldon Stanton. University of Texas at Arlington.
for his invaluable insights into principles of constitutional and republican democracy.
I W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Pow-
er, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971); see, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Stan-
dard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 431 (2002) (citing John
J.A. Burke, Contracts as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 285, 290
(2000)): see also Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1173. 1188 89 (1983) ("Today, very likely the majority of signed documents are adhe-
sive.").
2 See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion Some Thoughts About Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629. 631 32 (1943); Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1177; Slawson. supra note
1, at 530.
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trust (or simply hope) that the merchant will behave in a manner favorable to the
consumer when circumstances arise to give the merchant an opportunity to en-
force one-sided contract terms, because the merchant wishes to maintain a fa-
vorable reputation in the marketplace among current and future prospective cus-
tomers.3
Whatever the reasons, the fact is that consumers regularly sign or oth-
erwise manifest assent to standard form contracts. When they do so, however,
they are usually only cognizant of a few of the terms of the contract - things
like price, subject matter, and quantity.4 The remainder of the contract terms,
buried in the "fine print" or "boilerplate" language, remain unknown to the con-
sumer because he has not read those terms.' This has caused concern and con-
sternation among contracts scholars because the quintessential aspect of contrac-
tual obligations is supposed to be that they are bargained for, fully negotiated,
and voluntarily undertaken through the process of mutual assent.6  Standard
3 Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1225-28; Slawson, supra note 1, at 530-31. As Hillman and Rach-
linski point out:
Consumers also have good reason to believe that the standard terms are not
something to worry about. Consumers recognize that boilerplate language is
usually a matter of customary practice within an industry, rather than an at-
tempt by a single business to exploit them.... Consumers may sign standard-
form contracts without reading them carefully because they believe that most
businesses are not willing to risk the cost to their reputation of using terms to
exploit consumers.
Hillman & Rachlinski. supra note 1. at 446 47 (citing Burke, supra note 1. at 286 90).
4 Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1225-28.
5 Id.
6 The articles addressing standard form contracts are legion. See Wayne Barnes, Toward a
Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to Standard Form Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Sub-
section 211(3). 82 WASH. L. REV. 227. 228 n.1 (2007) (citing Nathan Isaacs. The Standardizing of
Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917)); Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 627 (2002): John D. Calamari, Duty to Read A Changing Concept. 43
FORDHAM L. REV. 341 (1974); Melvin Aron Eisenberg. The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of
Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 1; Friedrich Kessler,
Contracts of Adhesion Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629
(1943); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionabili-
ty, 70 U. Ci. L. REV. 1203 (2003)); Karl Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700 (1939);
Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L.
REV. 485 (1967); Michael 1. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory
of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263 (1993): John E. Murray. Jr.. The Stan-
dardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
735 (1981); John E. Murray. Jr., The Parol Evidence Process and Standardized Agreements Un-
der the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1342 (1975); Todd D. Rakoff,
Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1173 (1983); W. David
Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts Law by Standard
Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21 (1984); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Demo-
cratic Control of Lawmaking Power. 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971) [hereinafter Standard Form




form contracting cuts against this paradigmatic conception of the contracting
process, since the consumer will not have negotiated, nor even typically be
aware of, many of the contract terms which he assents to by signing the contract
(or clicking his assent online when prompted to do so).' Because many of the
terms were not actually known to the consumer at the time he gave his assent to
the contract, it may be a surprise to him later when such an unknown term is
enforced. An arbitration clause,8 or a clause limiting the merchant's liability in
damages, 9 are two recurring examples. Nevertheless, contract doctrine posits
that the consumer had a theoretical duty to read the contract that he signed, and
therefore it is not an excuse that he did not realize the contract he signed con-
tained the unfavorable term. He is bound. 10
The plight of the consumer being surprised by such unknown terms in
form contracts has caused a great deal of academic discourse, much of which
argues for some type of ameliorative relief to the consumer in this scenario.'
And, in fact, consumers do have some limited protections from particularly
egregious contract terms, the prime example of which is the doctrine of uncons-
cionability.12 But, for the most part, there is much angst caused by the consum-
er's required adherence to such terms which were completely unknown to him
at the time the form contract was signed. 13 There is among many a sense in
which justice and principles of autonomy are not quite served by completely
binding consumers to unexpected terms in the fine print of the standard form
contracts that they sign or assent to, since they did not exactly "agree" to those
terms in a classic, contractual sense. But, the perfect solution does not yet ap-
pear to have emerged from the academic debate. If it has, it does not appear to
have been adopted by any courts or legislatures in any meaningful manner.
The point of this Article is not formulation of another proposal for a
fairer means of binding consumers to the terms in the standard form contracts
that they sign. 14 For purposes of this Article, I will assume (as I must) that the
7 Rakoff, supra note 1. at 1180.
8 Agreements to arbitrate are generally enforceable under either the federal or applicable state
statutory provisions. See Eleanor L. Grossman et. al., 4 AM. JUR. 2D, Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion § 88 (2009) (citing Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emp. of America,
Division 85 v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co.. 142 A.2d 734 (Pa. 1958)).
9 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-719 (2004).
10 Rakoff, supra note 1. at 1185.
11 See supra note 6.
12 See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2004); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979); see gen-
erally Left, supra note 6.
13 Barnett. supra note 6. at 627. ("[C]ontract theorists are nothing if not suspicious of [form
contracts], having long ago dubbed them pejoratively 'contracts of adhesion.' Indeed, I would
wager that a plurality of contracts teachers would favor a judicial refusal to enforce form contracts
altogether - or could not explain exactly why they would reject such a suggestion.").
14 1 have already joined that chorus once before. See Barnes, supra note 6.
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duty to read is alive and well, and that its death is not imminent. 15 Rather, what
I seek to do in this Article is compare the process of a consumer signing a stan-
dard form contract to another type of familiar decision-making process, one that
is very paramount to our society and yet one in which we permit and sanction
somewhat similar types of unexpected outcomes not contemplated by the deci-
sion-maker at the time of the decision.
The process I am referring to is a citizen voting for a candidate for polit-
ical office in our system of constitutional representative democracy. There are
many parallels to be drawn and many of the same types of concerns that are
addressed and vindicated in these two processes - of assenting to a standard
form contract on the one hand, and voting for a political candidate for office on
the other hand. Both are acts of consent, based on limited information and li-
mited ability to accurately predict the future.' 6 Both could result in things hap-
pening which were unexpected at the time of the initial grant of consent.17 Nev-
ertheless, with some notable exceptions - e.g., unconscionability in the con-
tracts context, impeachment or recall in the voting context - both acts of con-
sent are binding and not reversible for the duration of the commitment.' This is
because, in both contexts, there is a need for stability and continuity - in the
contracts context, such stability is needed in order to ensure a reliable market-
place; whereas in the voting context, such stability is needed in order to ensure
the continuity and ongoing orderly operation of the government.19 In both cas-
es, the primary means by which the original consenting party may make his
concerns felt and validated is by selecting a different person or company to con-
sent with next time - in the case of contracting, this means the consumer
choosing to buy goods or services from someone else in the market; whereas in
the voting context, this means the voter voting the incumbent official out of
office and instead voting a new candidate into officer.
The thesis of the Article is that assenting to unknown forms in standard
form contracts is legitimate and bears significant similarities to voting for a po-
litical candidate to office in a representative democratic assembly. Since we
countenance unanticipated occurrences and outcomes in the aftermath of a voter
selecting a candidate for office in an election, in the context of the foundational
act of utmost importance to the ongoing survival and operation of our constitu-
tional democracy, it is perhaps of no greater concern that we countenance unan-
ticipated occurrences and outcomes in the aftermath of a consumer selecting a
15 1 will thus avoid, tempting as it may be, making this another "The Death of... " article.
See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974): Val D. Ricks, The Death of Offers,
79 IND. L.J. 667 (2004); Robert E. Scott, The Death of Contract Law, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 369
(2004).
16 See infra Part IV.A.
17 See id.
18 See infra Part IV.B.
19 See id.
20 See infra Part IV.C.
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merchant to transact with by way of standard form contract. That is to say, if
we tolerate the uncertainty of outcomes in the voting context, even though such
uncertainty means, in retrospect, that the voter's consent was not as fully mea-
ningful as it might otherwise have been had all the future outcomes been known
and able to have been included in the calculus of the voter's decision, it is ac-
ceptable to tolerate it in the (arguably) less significant context of the individual
consumer's assent to a transaction in the form of a standard form contract,
which may nevertheless result in unexpected outcomes. Seen in this light, the
contract doctrine of duty to read and binding nature of consent to form contracts
becomes more palatable. Part Ii of this Article will discuss the background of
use of standard form contracts in practice, and the contract doctrine applicable
to their use. Part III will discuss the basic principles of representative democra-
cy in a republican form of government based on constitutionalism, with specific
focus on the duration of the elected representative's term of office and the rea-
sons therefore. Part IV will compare the processes of a consumer transacting by
standard form contract and a citizen voting for a political candidate in an elec-
tion and show the similarities between these two processes as it relates to the
meaningfulness of consent given and the enforceability of such consent notwith-
standing unanticipated outcomes in the aftermath of the decision. Part V will
offer a brief conclusion.
ii. STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS AND GOVERNING DOCTRINE
The use of standard form contracts is ubiquitous and ever-present:
Standard form contracts probably account for more than ninety-
nine percent of all the contracts now made. Most persons have
difficulty remembering the last time they contracted other than
by standard form; except for casual oral agreements, they prob-
ably never have. But if they are active, they contract by stan-
dard form several times a day. Parking lot and theater tickets,
package receipts, department store charge slips, and gas station
credit card purchase slips are all standard form contracts.2'
21 Slawson, supra note 1. at 529. One of the first scholarly discussions of the use of form
contracts described the phenomenon this way:
No longer do individuals bargain for this or that provision in the contract ....
The control of the wording of those contracts has passed into the hands of the
concern, and the drafting into the hands of its legal advisor .... In the trades
affected it is henceforth futile for an individual to attempt any modification.
and incorrect for the economist and lawyer to classify or judge such arrange-
ments as standing on an equal footing with individual agreements.
Meyerson, supra note 6, at 1264 (quoting OTTO PRAUSNITZ. THE STANDARDIZATION OF
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND COMMERCIAL LAW 18 (1937). reviewed in Karl Llewel-
lyn, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. REv. 700 (1939)).
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Nothing has changed since David Slawson made these observations nearly forty
years ago. Instead, the use of boilerplate form contract language has prolife-
rated even further,22 especially with the advent of online terms of use and li-
cense agreements, assented to by the web user simply "clicking" their consent or
merely browsing the website. 3 In fact, Robert Hillman and Jeffrey Rachlinski
have aptly observed that "[t]he Internet is turning the process of contracting on
its head. 24 Consumers are agreeing to form contracts in unprecedented num-
25bers, all with a few easy clicks of the mouse.
Form contracts generally share certain attributes, whether they are en-
tered into online or "offline." In his seminal article on form contracts, Todd
Rakoff identified seven essential attributes about form contracts and their use in
transactions:
(1) The document whose legal validity is at issue is a printed
form that contains many terms and clearly purports to be a con-
tract.
(2) The form has been drafted by, or on behalf of, one party to
the transaction.
(3) The drafting party participates in numerous transactions of
the type represented by the form and enters into these transac-
tions as a matter of routine.
(4) The form is presented to the adhering party [i.e., the con-
sumer] with the representation that, except perhaps for a few
identified items (such as the price term), the drafting party will
enter into the transaction only on the terms contained in the
document. This representation may be explicit or may be im-
plicit in the situation, but it is understood by the adherent.
(5) After the parties have dickered over whatever terms are
open to bargaining, the document is signed by the adherent.
(6) The adhering party enters into few transactions of the type
represented by the form - few, at least, in comparison with the
drafting party.
22 Korobkin, supra note 6. at 1203.
23 Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 1. at 431.
24 Id. at 429.
25 Barnes. supra note 6. at 229.
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(7) The principal obligation of the adhering party in the trans-
action considered as a whole is the payment of money.26
Merchants use standard form contracts for a number of reasons, includ-
ing the reduction of risk and the increase in efficiency and reduction in costs
27achieved by not having to individually negotiate each individual contract.
Moreover, merchants are well aware that they will probably not lose many cus-
tomers by using such forms, both because the typical consumer won't appreciate
the risk of agreeing to the term (if they even read it), and also because the typi-
cal consumer will assume (likely with a high degree of accuracy) that other
merchants in the marketplace will impose similar terms in their form contracts. 28
Consumers thus perceive the following about form contracts: (1) they can't ne-
gotiate for different terms, (2) the contingencies addressed by the terms will
probably not occur, (3) consumers don't typically do any shopping or compari-
sons of any terms other than key terms like price, (4) they can ignore the tech-
nical terms and simply rely instead on the goodwill and reputation of the mer-
chant to "do the right thing," notwithstanding a formal legal right to later en-
force a one-sided term.29 Thus, that consumers do not typically even bother
30reading form contracts is almost regarded as an axiom.
The use of standard form contracts represents a departure from the pa-
radigmatic contracting process between two parties actively negotiating and
bargaining over all terms and aspects of the agreement. 3 1 That is, "[d]eeply em-
bedded within the law of contracts, viewed as private law, lies the image of in-
dividuals meeting in the marketplace .... The usage of form contracts has
therefore challenged the law of contracts and mutual assent, since this active
negotiation doesn't occur. This is reflected in the comments to Restatement
section 211 regarding form contracts:
26 Rakoff, supra note 1. at 1177 (footnote omitted).
27 See Kessler, supra note 2, at 631-32; Slawson, supra note 1, at 530-31.
28 Slawson, supra note 1, at 531.
29 Rakoff, supra note 1. at 1225 28.
30 See id. at 1179 (citing P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 731
(1979): K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370-71 n.338 (1960);
I. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS 445 (2d ed. 1978): Robert A. Hillman. Debunking Some Myths About
Unconscionability: A New Framework for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1. 13
(1981); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd Consumers and the Common Law
Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 349 (1970); K.N. Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions
Upon Economics, 15 AM. ECON. REV. 665, 673 (1925); Arnold Louis Rotkin, Standard Forms:
Legal Documents in Search of an Appropriate Body of Law, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 603 (1977);
Standard Form Contracts, supra note 6; Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in
Consumer Transactions, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 400, 425-26 (1973)).
3 Slawson, supra note 1. at 529 ("The contracting still imagined by courts and law teachers as
typical, in which both parties participate in choosing the language of their entire agreement, is no
longer of much more than historical importance.").
32 Rakoff. supra note 1. at 1216.
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A party who makes regular use of a standardized form of
agreement does not ordinarily expect his customers to under-
stand or even to read the standard terms. One of the purposes of
standardization is to eliminate bargaining over details of indi-
vidual transactions, and that purpose would not be served if a
substantial number of customers retained counsel and reviewed
the standard terms. Employees regularly using a form often
have only a limited understanding of its terms and limited au-
thority to vary them. Customers do not in fact ordinarily under-
stand or even read the standard terms.33
Thus, most of the terms are contained in boilerplate language which is not dis-
cussed or read by the consumer, let alone actively negotiated.
Nevertheless, standard form contracts are contracts, and contracts are
supposed to be formed by assent.34 As Michael Meyerson has observed, "Stan-
dard form contracts have been in use for over two centuries, and the question of
the proper construction of these contracts has haunted contract law ever since.
' 35
One of the first scholarly attempts to articulate a theory of consumer assent to
standard form contracts was posited by Karl Llewellyn:
Instead of thinking about "assent" to boiler-plate clauses, we
can recognize that so far as concerns the specific, there is no as-
sent at all. What has in fact been assented to, specifically, are
the few dickered terms, and the broad type of the transaction,
and but one thing more. That one thing more is a blanket assent
(not a specific assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms
the seller may have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate
the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms. The fine print
which has not been read has no business to cut under the rea-
sonable meaning of those dickered terms which constitute the
dominant and only real expression of agreement, but much of it
36commonly belongs in.
This formulation recognizes the commercial reality that, by signing the form
contract, the consumer is essentially trusting the merchant as to the non-
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1979).
3 See id § 17(1) ("... [T]he formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a
manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration.").
3 Meyerson, supra note 6. at 1263. Meyerson notes that the first standard form contracts were
used in the late 1700s for marine insurance contracts. Id. at 1263 64 (citing OTTO PRAUSNITZ.
THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW 11
(1937), reviewed in Karl Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700 (1939)).
36 KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 (1960).
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negotiated provisions of the contract.3  As was colorfully described by Robert
Braucher: "We all know that if you have a page of print, whether it's large or
small, which nobody is really expected to read, and you expect to agree to it,
and you sort of put your head in the lion's mouth and hope it will be a friendly
lion .... ,38
Llewellyn's description of the law of assent to standard form contracts
is a fairly accurate articulation of the state of the law today. Under the "duty to
read" rule, the consumer who signs a standard form contract is taken to have
assented to it and become bound by its terms. 39 That is, "[O]ne having the ca-
pacity to understand a written document who reads it, or, without reading it or
having it read to him, signs it, is bound by his signature. 4 0 And further, as Ra-
koff correctly noted, "[I]t is legally irrelevant whether the [consumer] actually
read the contents of the document, or understood them, or subjectively assented
to them.",
4 1
There are few exceptions to the rule that a consumer is bound to the
terms of a form contract that he signs.42 Llewellyn's formulation recognized
that the consumer should not be bound by any "unreasonable" or "indecent"
terms.4 3 The primary doctrine which has come to be utilized to vindicate Lle-
wellyn's concern for such terms is the unconscionability doctrine. Unconscio-
nability has been defined as "that which 'affronts the sense of decency;"' anoth-
er definition provides that it is that which lies "outside the limits of what is rea-
sonable or acceptable: shockingly unfair, harsh, or unjust. '44  Under various
formulations of the doctrine, the rule is that upon a showing of unconscionabili-
ty of the contract, the court may simply deny enforcement - effectively dis-
charging the consumer from his contractual obligations arising from the form
3 Barnes, supra note 6, at 240-41 (citing Rakoff; supra note 1, at 1200).
38 Robert Braucher, The American Law Institute Forty-Seventh Annual Meeting, 47 A.L.I.
PROC. 525 (1970).
39 JOSEPH PERILLO, 7 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 29.8. at 402 (rev. ed. 2002).
40 Id. at 402-03 (quoting Rossi v. Douglas, 100 A.2d 3, 7 (Md. 1953)); see also Rakoff, supra
note 1, at 1185 ("The adherent's signature on a document clearly contractual in nature, which he
had an opportunity to read, will be taken to signify his assent and thus will provide the basis for
enforcing the contract.").
41 Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1185. Rakoff also stated, consistent with Llewellyn's formulation,
that "the adherent's assent covers all the terms of the document, and not just the custom-tailored
ones' or the ones that have been discussed." Id.
42 Id. ("Exceptions to the foregoing principles are narrow. In particular, failure of the drafting
party to point out or explain the form terms does not constitute an excuse. Instead, in the absence
of extraordinary circumstances, the adherent can establish an excuse only by showing affirmative
participation by the drafting party in causing misunderstanding.").
43 LLEWELLYN. supra note 36, at 370.
44 PERILLO, supra note 39. at § 9.40. p. 372 73 (quoting Gimbel Bros. v. Swift, 62 Misc. 2d
156, 307 N.Y.S.2d 952 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970); WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED (3d ed.
1996)).
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contract.4 5 Unconscionability, however, is rarely successful as a remedy,4 6 and
is only applicable when the contract is "extraordinarily unfair.,
47
Therefore, the vast majority of the time, the consumer will be bound by
the terms of the standard form contract, with no legal means to avoid its obliga-
tions. This is obviously true even if, as will often be the case, the consumer is
later disappointed by the revelation of an unfavorable term and its application to
the parties to the contract. So, for instance, suppose the typical scenario of a
consumer's purchase of a good from a seller. The sale is consummated by,
among other things, the consumer's signature (or clicking online) indicating
assent to the terms of the seller's standard form contract. The consumer as-
sumed at the time that the seller stood behind the good, as of course on some
level the seller presumably does. The consumer did not read the form, besides
noting that it contained the correct description of the good purchased, and the
correct price agreed to be paid. The consumer was unaware, therefore, that the
contract contained an arbitration clause, requiring the consumer to arbitrate any
claims arising from problems with the good. When a problem arises and the
consumer wishes to sue, he is disappointed when confronted with the unex-
pected reality - the arbitration clause. However, he is bound nevertheless,
notwithstanding his disappointed expectations.
Contract law, and the duty to read, arguably compel this result. The
reason, at bottom, is the need for stability in the marketplace and enforceability
of such contracts. The rationale is that if the duty to read law was not applica-
ble, merchants could not count on the enforceability of the form contracts signed
by their customers, because they could too easily complain that they hadn't read
45 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 (2004); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979) ("If
a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable
result."). Technically, unconscionability has been conceptualized as two distinct inquiries: (1)
procedural unconscionability and (2) substantive unconscionability. Leff, supra note 6, at 487.
Procedural unconscionability is concerned with fairness of the bargaining process i.e., the
unequal bargaining power between the parties and the fact that the contract contains boilerplate
and is thus hard to access during the contracting process. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 1, at
456-57. Substantive unconscionability is concerned not with the process, but rather the content of
the deal. Id. Thus, excludable terms include those which "are immoral, conflict with public poli-
cy. deny a party substantially what she bargained for, or have no reasonable purpose in the trade."
Id. (citing ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW 138 (1997)).
46 See generally Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce L. Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability:
An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067 (2006) (providing empirical
data on rates of success of unconscionability claims).
47 Meyerson, supra note 6, at 1286 (citing Jeffrey Davis, Revamping Consumer-Credit Con-
tract Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1337 (1982)); see also Barnes, supra note 6, at 248 ("... [S]hort
of outright oppression or conscience-shocking terms, courts have been much less predictable in
using unconscionability as a tool for policing terms to which consumers did not clearly assent and




or understood the fine print in the contract; and the resultant effect would be that
commercial activity in the marketplace would effectively be paralyzed. 48 There-
fore, reasons of stability and predictability dictate that the consumer is bound to
the contract for its terms and duration.
Of course, the same marketplace that demands that consumers' standard
form contracts remain enforceable notwithstanding disappointed expectations,
also gives consumers a remedy of a different sort - namely, the marketplace
itself. That is, a consumer who is not happy with the outcome of his dealings
with a particular merchant can always exercise his autonomous ability to choose
to transact with a different merchant - perhaps a competitor - the next time
the consumer has need for the same or similar goods or services. 49 This ability,
though short of a legal means to avoid obligations under the unfavorable con-
tract, nevertheless gives the consumer options to vindicate his expectations and
demands in the marketplace.
Notwithstanding this legal paradigm for the enforceability of standard
form contracts, there have been scores of protests within the scholarly debate.5"
For purposes of the present analysis, three examples will suffice. Arthur Leff
suggested that a legitimate possibility in the development of form contract doc-
trine was that all terms that are not read should simply not be enforced, since
they were neither bargained for nor consented to.5' Todd Rakoff referred to
such unread terms which had not been separately negotiated as "invisible terms"
(as opposed to the actively negotiated terms which he coined "visible terms").
Rakoff proposed that all such "invisible terms" be presumptively unenforceable,
with default rules filling in the gaps left.5 2 David Slawson cleverly proposed to
treat form contracts similarly to legal regulations promulgated under principles
of administrative law. That is, Slawson proposed that the actual negotiated
terms of a form contract (likely to be things like price, quantity, etc.) be treated
as the "law" or "statute" of the contract, so that the remaining unread terms "be
scrutinized for consistency with the negotiated terms, in the fashion of adminis-




The debate therefore continues to rage in the contracts scholarship, and
it is a commonplace among academics in this area that the doctrine governing
48 PERILLO, supra note 39, at 403-04 (citing Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation and the
Duty to Read Business Run by JBAlf Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND.
L. REV. 1051 (1966)).
49 See Todd D. Rakoff, The Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1235. 1237
(2006) ("Viewed now as part of a working social system, contracts are assumed to be the products
of competition in the marketplace.").
50 See supra note 6.
51 Arthur Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 144 (1970); Leff, supra note 6, at
508; Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1207 (citing Arthur Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd Con-
sumers and the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 349 (1970).
52 Meyerson, supra note 6, at 1278 (citing Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1220-48).
53 Barnes. supra note 6. at 242 (citing Slawson, supra note 1, at 541-42).
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form contracts leaves much to be desired, insofar as it fails to vindicate the con-
sumer's concerns. To reiterate, the primary issue which troubles many in the
contracts scholarship is the reality that courts are enforcing terms in contracts
which the consumer never read, and to which the consumer did not even realize
(at least subjectively) he was agreeing. This results in the imposition upon the
consumer of unexpected results, such as an arbitration clause which he didn't
realize would be imposed upon him. The contract, absent unconscionability, is
nevertheless enforceable for the duration of its term. The consumer may, of
course, decide to transact with a different merchant the next time around. How-
ever, the binding nature of the term which was unread and unknown to the con-
sumer at the time of contracting remains persistently troubling to many.
III. ELECTIONS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
The purpose of this Article is to compare the process of assenting to
standard form contracts, which has been described above, to the process of a
citizen's vote for political candidates in a system of representative democracy.
Therefore, this part will briefly address the basic tenets and philosophies behind
such an electoral system, insofar as is applicable and helpful for present purpos-
es, so as to set up the direct analogy between the two processes which will fol-
low in the next part.
The United States, as well as the individual states, and most democra-
cies in the world, are representative, rather than direct, democracies 4 Though
the term "democracy," "republic," and "representative democracy" are often
now thought of as relatively synonymous, in fact they mean different things
entirely.55 A "pure" or "direct" democracy is one in which the assembled citi-
zens of the state have a direct voice in shaping legislation or public policy.
56
The most famous historical example of a type of government which approx-
imated direct democracy was the Athenian government of ancient Greece.
57
However, the founding fathers of the American constitution rejected the concept
of direct democracy as unworkable and undesirable.58
54 Among modern nations, Switzerland appears to be somewhat of an exception. See Ingolf
Pernice, The Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel Constitutionalism in Action, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 349,
363 (2009) ("Direct democracy is not the regular mode in most of the EU Member States, nor is it
common, at least at the national level, in the American or any other constitutional system in the
world with the famous exception of Switzerland.").
55 THOMAS E. PATTERSON, THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 50 (5th ed. 2001).
56 Id.
57 See BERNARD MANIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 8 (1997).
58 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 133 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed. 1961).
The most pertinent passage is as follows:
From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by
which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assem-
ble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mi-
schiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be
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Instead of direct democracy, the founders of the American constitution 9
created a republic - a system of representative government - whereby the
general population would exercise their sovereignty by electing representatives
to enact public policies and promulgate legislation in their stead. 60 As stated in
The Federalist No. 39, "[W]e may define a republic to be, or at least may bes-
tow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indi-
rectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding
their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior.,
61
The reasons for preferring representative democracy - i.e., a republican gov-
ernment - over direct democracy were twofold. First, the founders believed
that interposing a representative body would prevent the temporary passions of
the majority of the populace from resulting in the passage of improvident legis-
lation.6 2 Specifically, they posited that representation's effect was "to refine and
enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body
of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country and
whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to tempo-
rary or partial considerations. 63 Second, they believed that the larger territory
of the United States not only lent itself better to republican government from a
sheer logistical perspective, but that the inclusion of representatives from a wide
variety of geographic areas would also have a moderating influence on the poli-
cies enacted by the deliberative assembly.64  Therefore, though representative
felt by a majority of the whole: a communication and concert result from the
form of government itself: and there is nothing to check the inducements to
sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such
democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ev-
er been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property;
and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in
their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of gov-
ernment, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect
equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly
equalized and assimilated in their possessions. their opinions, and their pas-
sions.
Id.
59 Though the principles of representative democracy are by no means limited to illustration by
looking to the United States as an example, I will largely restrict myself to using the United States
as a basis for illustration. The reasons are, of course, that that this is the system with which I
expect most of the readers of this Article to be familiar (as I am). and also that it is perhaps the
prominent example of constitutional democracy in the world at this time.
60 See PATTERSON, supra note 55, at 50; THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
61 THE FEDERALIST No. 39. at 280 81 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed. 1961).
62 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
63 MANIN, supra note 57, at 2 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 10).
64 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
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democracy was not without its critics,65 the Constitution created a representative
form of government.
Though the founders created a representative form of government, they
very much agreed with the idea that no government was legitimate except that
which was based on the consent of the people. Therefore, the famous statement
from the Declaration of Independence provides the following foundational phi-
losophies:
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain un-
alienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the
pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments
are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the
Consent of the Governed.66
With these statements, the founding fathers established their embrace of social
contract theory. 67 That is, the philosophy of the founders - borrowed from
Rousseau, Montesquieu, Hobbes and Locke - was that the people possessed
certain inalienable, or natural, rights, which they willingly surrendered to a cer-
tain extent in favor of the creation of a government, the purpose of which is to
ensure order and safety so that the natural rights of man may be meaningfully
enjoyed. 68 Therefore, the formation of government in an original sense is seen
as legitimized because of the original consent of the people involved in its
founding.
In a representative democracy, however, there is an additional, recurring
element of citizen consent on which the continuing operation of the government
65 Rousseau famously declared: "The people of England regards itself as free; but it is grossly
mistaken; it is free only during the election of members of parliament. As soon as they are
elected, slavery overtakes it, and it is nothing. The use it makes of the short moments of liberty it
enjoys shows indeed that it deserves to lose them." JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT 95 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1988) (1762).
66 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
67 See, e.g.. Susan Henderson-Utis, What Would the Founding Fathers Do? The Rise of Reli-
gious Programs in the United States Prison System, 52 HOWARD L.J. 459, 465 66 (2009) (citing
Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?. 100 YALE L.J. 909, 914 (1991) ("Social contract think-
ing played an important role.., in the origins of the American Constitution .... "); Greg Sergien-
ko, Social Contract Neutrality and the Religion Clauses of the Federal Constitution, 57 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1263, 1268 (1996) ("The common understanding of the Framers, ratifiers, and the public at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights was that these documents em-
bodied a social contract theory of government.")).
68 Henderson-Utis, supra note 67, at 465 (citing Honorable Douglas H. Ginsburg, On Consti-
tutionalism, 2003 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 7, 9 ("In these Enlightenment conceptions of the social
contract, Rousseau and Montesquieu, Hobbes and Locke, imagine each citizen voluntarily ceding
to all others, or to the polity, or to a particular leader, the unrestrained liberty of a state of nature in




is derived - election. The citizen's act of voting in a representative democracy
is his indication of consent - consent to allow the representative voted on to act
69in his stead in matters of policy and legislation and governance. It has there-
fore been observed that "[t]he central institution of representative government is
election. ' '70 This refers, of course, to the ongoing requirement that candidates
for representative office stand for election by their constituents in the general
population. In the United States Constitution, the framers debated and decided
upon periodic elections for both the executive and legislative branches. The
members of House of Representatives are elected every second year- i.e., for
'71 . 72two-year terms. Senators are elected every six years. The President is se-
lected by the electoral college every four years, with a limit as to the number of
terms that may be served] 3
What, however, is the citizen "consenting" to when he votes for a par-
ticular candidate for office? That is, what are the expectations of the voter in
regards to the term in office of the voter's elected representative? Must the rep-
resentative always act in accordance with the desires of his constituency? "An
old and familiar debate sets a characterization of democratically elected repre-
sentatives as the agents of their constituents against a view of politicians as au-
tonomous actors who are inhibited only by periodic reviews reserved to the
electorate.,, 74 The former view - that a representative is bound by mandate to
act in accordance with his constituents' precise wishes - has the benefit of cor-
responding to the idea of the sovereignty of the people. 75 However, the latter
view appears to conform more to the realities of modern representation. Under
this view, sometimes called the "trusteeship" position and famously championed
by Edmund Burke, an elected representative is free to make his own decisions
about what policy choices would best further the interests of his constituents.
76
Of course, come election day, the representative will answer for the political
69 Christopher W. Carmichael, Proposals for Reforming the American Electoral System After
the 2000 Presidential Election: Universal Voter Registration, Mandatory Voting, and Negative
Balloting, 23 HAMiLiNE J. PuB. L. & POL'Y 255, 258 (2002) (noting that "[a] majority of Americans
no longer register their consent to be governed by failing to vote in elections.").
70 MANIN, supra note 57, at 6.
71 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
72 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
73 U.S. CONST. art. II, §1; U.S. CONST. amend. XII & amend. XXII. Though the framers did
not originally intend that the general public would have a direct role in selecting the President,
such a role was eventually brought about by President Andrew Jackson persuading the states to
select their delegates to the electoral college based on the results of the popular vote. PATTERSON.
supra note 55. at 53. Since then, only three presidents have been elected without also winning the
popular vote Rutherford B. Hayes (1876), Benjamin Harrison (1888), and George W. Bush
(2000). Id.
74 Saul Levmore, Precommitment Politics, 82 VA. L. REV. 567, 567 (1996).
75 Id.
76 Id. (citing Edmund Burke, To the Electors of Bristol, in 1 THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HON.
EDMUND BURKE 178 80 (1837)).
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popularity of his actions." But before that time he has relative independence.7 8
As will be seen momentarily, this is reinforced by the fact of fixed terms in of-
fice.
This Article should here mention briefly, with a view towards advanc-
ing the analogy it wishes to make, the type of information and degree to which
the voter has knowledge of the governance and decision-making which will be
performed on his behalf in the aftermath of his vote consenting to representation
by the candidate. Stated more simply, and with a view to the applicable data,
what affects the voter's choice of candidate in an election? Making any defini-
tive types of findings in this regard is extremely difficult, if not impossible.7 9
However, certain recurring things appear to influence voters' choices." First,
voters are affected by their perceptions of a candidate's image generally. 81
Second, voters are heavily influenced by party alignment - that is, a voter that
identifies with the Democratic party is much more likely to vote for the Demo-
cratic candidate (vs. the Republican candidate) for any particular election, all
things being equal (though the degree of a voter's affiliation with one party or
the other is obviously a variable) . Finally, of course, voters may make deci-
sions on a candidate based on the candidate's stance on one or more political
issues.8 3 In fact, many blocks of voters have been labeled so-called "single is-
sue" voters, because their voting decision is based on a candidate's adherence to
the voter's point of view on the single issue of choice - in recent years, abor-
tion has been such an issue for many voters. 84 Of course, there is always also
the ancillary problem of voter apathy and ignorance - that is, voters do not
educate themselves (through newspapers, television, the Internet or otherwise)
about candidates' positions and political issues, and either do not vote at all, or
vote in ignorance of all or almost all of the critical issues affecting the elec-
tion.85
77 MANIN, supra note 57, at 237.
78 Id. at 6 ("The decision-making of those who govern retains a degree of independence from
the wishes of the electorate.").
79 WILLIAM H. FLANIGAN & NANCY H. ZINGALE, POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF THE AMERICAN
ELECTORATE 209 (11 th Ed. 2006).
80 The factors mentioned herein tend to be mostly data gathered from presidential elections, as
opposed to elections of other types of representatives. Id. at 197.
8I Id. at 198 202.
82 Id. at 202-04.
83 Id. at 204-09.
84 Id. at 204. "There is nothing new about this phenomenon [single-issue voting]. The classic
example of single-issue voting in American politics was abolition, an issue of such intensity that it
destroyed the Whig Party, launched several new parties including the Republican Party. and was a
major contributing factor to the Civil War." Id.
85 See, e.g.. Christopher Shea. Is Voter Ignorance Killing Democracy?, SALONCOM, Nov. 22,
1999, http: //www.salon.com/books/it/ 1999/11/22/voter/ ("One of the dirty little secrets of public-
opinion research is the jaw-dropping apathy and general boneheadedness of the electorate.").
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A candidate is obviously only elected for the term of the office sought,
but what if the voting public who elected the candidate becomes disappointed
with the performance of the official before the end of the term? Voters become
disappointed with the officials for whom they voted for any number of reasons.
For instance, voters may come to believe (after having voted for him) that Pres-
ident Obama and his Democratic allies may be rushing too quickly into accept-
ing some degree of governmental ownership of industry participants like motor
vehicle manufacturers and banks.86 Obviously, many voters for President
George W. Bush disagreed with his decision to invade Iraq and topple Saddam
Hussein - especially when considered in light of the fact of his 2000 campaign
stance that he was opposed to "nation building." 8' Another example of an un-
expected disappointment to voters is a politician's switch to a different political
party after election - recent prominent examples of this are Senator Arlen
Specter of Pennsylvania (switching from the Republican Party to the Democrat-
ic Party) and Senator James Jeffords of Vermont (switching from the Republi-
can Party to Independent). 8 And, politicians can also switch their stance on the
hot-button issues that are extremely important to "single-issue" voters, with
abortion being perhaps the preeminent current example. After election as gov-
ernor of Massachusetts in 2002, Mitt Romney changed his stance on abortion
during his term as governor (from supporting abortion rights to opposing
them). 9 Perhaps less significantly, in 1980 George H. W. Bush changed his
stance on abortion rights, from supporting them to opposing them, (after having
run his own presidential campaign against Reagan during the 1980 Republican
presidential primary season) in order to become Ronald Reagan's vice-
presidential nominee. 90 Bush also famously broke his campaign pledge of "read
my lips - no new taxes." 91
In all of the scenarios just described above, the voters who selected
these candidates may become disappointed with the outcomes of the politician's
time in office. In some of the instances, the changed position may be regarding
86 See, e.g.. Jim Kuhnhenn & Ken Thomas, Government Motors: U.S. Will Own Sixty Percent
of GM, THE HUFFINGTON POST, May 31. 2009. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2009/05/31/government-motors-us-will n 209578.html.
87 See, e.g., Wayne Washington, Once Against Nation-Building, Bush Now Involved, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 2, 2004. at A11.
88 See Janet Hook & James Oliphant, Sen. Arlen Specter Switches Parties: Specter Tips the
Scales to Democrats, L.A.TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009, at 1. Interestingly, in 2001 Senator "Specter was
especially vocal at the time about Jeffords' defection, calling it disruptive and 'not good' for the
governance of the country. Specter proposed a rule barring party switches that turned the minority
into the majority. The proposal was never adopted." Id.
89 Scott Helman, Romney's Journey to the Right: Social Issue Stands Hardened Since '02,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 17, 2006, at Al.
90 Richard V. Allen, George Herbert Walker Bush; The Accidental Vice President, N.Y.
TIMES, July 30, 2000, § 6, at 636.
91 Leo P. Martinez, Tax Policy, Rational Actors, and Other Myths, 40 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 297,
306 (2009).
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something that the voter contemplated at the time of his decision to vote for the
candidate (with party affiliation being an obvious example). But, of course,
sometimes the disappointment will arise in the context of an issue that was not
even in the voter's contemplation at the time of the election - for instance, with
the decision to go to war unexpectedly, or the response to an unexpected eco-
nomic or other domestic crisis. And, as has been mentioned already, some-
times an issue will have been contemplated by a voter, but without the benefit of
accurate information.
Do voters have any recourse, before the end of the elected term, after
the election of such candidates who go on to disappoint them? The answer
tends to be no. With respect to the U.S. Constitution, the founders recognized
that problems could occur once candidates were elected into office: "Men of
factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by
corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the
interests, of the people. 92 Nevertheless, the founders arrived at fixed terms of
various durations for the elected officials under the U.S. Constitution (two years
for the House,93 six years for the Senate, and four years for the President).95
The balance involved in setting terms for office was addressed by the framers in
The Federalist No. 37:
The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side,
not only that all power should be derived from the people, but
that those intrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the
people, by a short duration of their appointments; and that even
during this short period the trust should be placed not in a few,
but a number of hands. Stability, on the contrary, requires that
the hands in which power is lodged should continue for a length
of time the same. A frequent change of men will result from a
frequent return of elections; and a frequent change of measures
from a frequent change of men ....
This statement establishes a couple of counterbalancing concerns in setting the
duration of terms in office for elected officials. As John Stuart Mill noted in his
seminal work Considerations on Representative Government, "[t]he principles
involved are here very obvious; the difficulty lies in their application., 97 The
duration of the representative's term should be brief enough to vindicate the
ability of the constituent population to exercise their sovereignty and vote on
92 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 134 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed. 1961).
93 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1.
94 I/d. art. 1, § 3. cl. 1.
95 Id. art. 1i. § 1, cl. 1.
96 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 268 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed. 1961).
97 JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 227 (1962).
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whether to keep the candidate in office. On the other hand, however, the elected
officials must be allowed to remain in office long enough so that some stability
and continuity of government is achieved. 9s Obviously, if elected terms were
too brief, there would tend to be too much instability and even chaos in govern-
ment, or at the very least an inability to accomplish much. Therefore, consid-
erations of stability require that the terms of elected officials be of sufficient
duration to allow the smooth operation of government functions.
The framers contemplated very few exceptions to the principle that
elected officials should hold office for the duration of their terms, believing that
to allow otherwise would undermine the republican character of the government
created by the new Constitution.99 In fact, in keeping with the republican cha-
racter of the new government, no ability was given to the voting public to pre-
maturely end a federal official's elected term in office. The one mechanism
initially considered - recall - was withdrawn from consideration at the consti-
tutional convention.100 Some states have recall provisions for state officials, but
such provisions have been infrequently used or successful.101 The only constitu-
98 Id. Mill observed:
On the one hand, the member ought not to have so long a tenure of his seat as
to make him forget his responsibility, take his duties easily, conduct them with
a view to his own personal advantage, or neglect those free and public confe-
rences with his constituents, which, whether he agrees or differs with them,
are one of the benefits of representative government. On the other hand, he
should have such a term of office to look forward to, as will enable him to be
judged not by a single act, but by his course of action .... It is impossible to
fix, by any universal rule, the boundary between these principles.
Id. at 227-28.
99 THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed. 1961).
It is sufficient for such a government that the persons administering it be ap-
pointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their
appointments by either of the tenures just specified otherwise every govern-
ment in the United States, as well as every other popular government that has
been or can be well organized or well executed, would be degraded from the
republican character.
Id. at 281.
100 THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND
RECALL 129 (Harvard University Press 1999).
The Constitutional Convention of 1787 considered but eventually rejected
resolutions calling for this same type of recall [of Senators by the state legisla-
tures as provided in the Articles of Confederation] .... In the end, the idea of
placing a recall provision in the Constitution died for lack of support - at
least from those participating in the ratifying conventions. The framers and the
ratifiers were consciously seeking to remedy what they viewed as the defects
of the Articles of Confederation and some of their state constitutions, and for
many of them this meant retreating from an excess of democracy.
Id.
10! National Conference of State Legislatures, Recall of State Officials (Mar. 21, 2006),
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspxtabid=16581. Such recall provisions began to be popular in the
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tional means for a member of the U.S. Congress to be removed prior to his
elected term in office is to be expelled by a two-thirds vote of the members of
the chamber in which the representative sits. 02 No grounds are specified for
removal, but in the rare historical instances in which members were expelled,
the grounds have "generally concerned cases of perceived disloyalty to the
United States, or the conviction of a criminal statutory offense which involved
abuse of one's official position."' 0 3  Finally, of course, the framers included
provisions for impeachment of the President, Vice President and all civil offic-
ers of the federal government. 104 Aside from being rarely invoked,10 5 the im-
peachment process is more akin to a legal or criminal device in that it is for
"Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors," than a political
device in the nature of recall or perhaps expulsion. °6 And further, of course,
like expulsion, it is not directly exercisable by the constituent voters themselves,
but rather must be effectuated by the voters' representatives in the Senate.1°7
The overarching conclusion to be drawn, for purposes of the present discussion,
is that elected officials in a representative democracy generally serve for the
entire duration of their terms, in spite of actions which may disappoint their
voters; exceptions to this are relatively rare or non-existent. 10 8 And even the
rare instances for early removal generally concern quite serious or grave mat-
ters. General disappointment with unexpected policy choices, even if based on
early twentieth century as part of the "Progressive Movement." Cong. Research Service, Jack
Maskell, Recall of Legislators and the Removal of Members of Congress from Office, Mar. 20,
2003 (citing G. THEODORE MITAU, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, POLITICS AND PROCESSES 90-
93 (Charles Scribner's Sons 1966); Elizabeth E. Mack, Comment, The Use and Abuse of Recall: A
Proposal for Legislative Recall Reform, 67 NEB. L. REV. 617, 621 25 (1988)).
102 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings,
punish its members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a
Member.").
103 Maskell, supra note 101, at Summary.
104 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 ("The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason. Bribery, or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.").
105 Terence J. Lau, Judicial Independence: A Call for Reform, 9 NEV. L.J. 79. 86 (2008) ("The
House has initiated sixty-two impeachment proceedings since 1789, resulting in the impeachment
of two Presidents (President Andrew Johnson and President Clinton, both acquitted), one cabinet
officer (William Belknap, Secretary of War, resigned and later acquitted), one Senator (Senator
William Blount, expelled, charges dismissed), one Supreme Court Justice (Justice Samuel Chase,
acquitted), and twelve other federal judges (most recently Judge Walter Nixon, convicted on No-
vember 3, 1989)." (citing U.S. Senate, Impeachment, http://www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Senate Impeachment Role.htm (last visited Feb. 26,
2010))).
106 National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 101.
107 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3. cl. 6.
108 MANIN, supra note 57. at 237 ("[T]he absence of imperative mandates, legally binding




direct campaign promises to the contrary, give no basis for relief during the
elected term because the promises are not binding in any legal manner.10 9 Ques-
tions of stability dictate the binding nature of elected terms in office."10
However, the voters do get to exercise their sovereignty over their rep-
resentatives at election time. This is the key component of our system of repre-
sentative government, which retains elements of democracy, and it is thus cor-
rect that "[t]he central institution of representative government is elec-
tion ..... "11 That voters get to decide whether to re-elect their representatives
based on their assessment of the representative's performance is obvious and of
paramount interest to the continuing legitimate operation of the constitutional
democracy, which is to be based on consent by the governed:
[S]ince representatives are subject to reelection, they know that
they will be held to account, and that, at that time, words will no
longer suffice. They know that their positions will be on the
line when, come election day, the electorate delivers its verdict
on their past actions. Prudence dictates, therefore, that they act
now in preparation for that day of popular judgment. The pros-
pective will of voters is no more than a wish, but when they are
not satisfied by the incumbents' performance, their verdict is a
command. At each election, voters make up their minds on the
basis both of what they would like for the future and what they
think of the past.'
12
Voters who are disappointed by the actions of a representative during the repre-
sentative's term thus may, on election day, discipline the unresponsive official
by voting him out of office and selecting a successor in the incumbent's
place. '1 3 This sovereignty exercised by the voters is evidence of the elements of
democracy in our system of republican government, and is of utmost importance
to retaining the legitimacy of our system of governance which must always be
derived "from the consent of the governed."'1 4 Therefore, though voters are
basically powerless to intervene during the term of their elected representatives
that have disappointed them while in office, they will eventually have the last
say by choosing whether to retain or displace the representatives on election
day. Such is the hallmark of our constitutional democracy.
109 See MANIN, supra note 57, at 237 ("[E]lected representatives are not bound by promises
made to voters. If people vote for a candidate because they favor the policy he proposes, their will
is no more than a wish."). For an interesting proposal to make campaign promises possibly enfor-
ceable, see Saul Levmore, Precommitment Politics, 82 VA. L. REv. 567 (1996).
110 THE FEDERALIST No. 37 (James Madison).
H MANN, supra note 57, at 6 7.
112 Id. at 237.
113 See Levmore, supra note 109, at 569-70.
114 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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IV. THE ANALOGY BETWEEN FORM CONTRACT AND VOTING
In the previous parts, I have set forth the basic doctrines and principles
regarding consumer assent to standard form contracts, and citizens voting for
representatives in a constitutional democracy, respectively. As was stated pre-
viously, binding consumers to unknown and unexpected terms in form contracts
has been criticized as violative of consumers' rights of autonomy in regard to
their freedom of contract. The purpose of this part is to compare the two
processes, and see if the comparison sheds any light on whether the duty to read
is nevertheless sanctionable. In this part, I will compare the two processes in
terms of the nature of the assent given, the generally binding nature of the assent
notwithstanding potential disappointed expectations, and the ultimate vindica-
tion of autonomy and sovereignty effectuated by facilitating the periodic oppor-
tunity for new manifestations of assent.
A. The Nature of the Assent Granted
Standard form contracts are contracts. When a consumer transacts with
a merchant by form contract, in order to buy a good or service, he is contracting
with the merchant. And the consumer is explicitly and consciously entering into
knowing agreement about certain terms - price, subject matter, and quantity, at
least. 115 I will call these simply the "known" terms. But there are a host of oth-
er terms - the "fine print" - which the consumer typically does not read and
thus the substantive content of which the consumer does not knowingly and
consciously discover. 16 i will call these simply the "unknown" terms. Because
contracts are supposed to be based on assent, and because theoretically the con-
sumer could have read and discovered the nature of the terms contained in the
standard form if he had wanted to, contract law concludes that by signing or
clicking the consumer is bound to the entire contract - known and unknown
terms. '" Binding the consumer to the known terms is obviously not usually
problematic, but there has been much academic concern registered over the
binding nature of the unknown terms, since they were not in reality substantive-
ly known about at the time of contractual assent.' 8
Let me shift, for a moment, to the type of assent registered by voters
when they participate by voting in an election for representatives in a republican
form of government. Election is the "central institution of representative gov-
ernment,"' 9 because it fosters the continued legitimacy of the government as
115 Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1225-28.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 1185.
118 See supra note 6.
119 MANIN, supra note 57, at 6.
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being based on "the consent of the governed."'12 0 As discussed previously, vot-
ers base their election decisions - if based on any particular knowledge or in-
formation at all' 2' - on numerous factors, including party affiliation, candidate
image, and the candidate's position on one or more issues 2  Taking this infor-
mation and these cognitive processes into account, voters may be said to "as-
sent" to their representation by a particular candidate when they vote for him -
that is, the voter casts his vote for a candidate and thereby registers his assent to
that candidate acting on his behalf in the deliberative assembly to which he is
elected.
But, it is equally clear that the citizen-voter's assent to have the repre-
sentative act in his stead has limits, and the voter's expectations will not always
be perfectly satisfied or vindicated as the representative's performance in office
unfolds over time. The wishes and expectations of the voter - that, for in-
stance, the representative will enact policy consistent with the voter's prefe-
rences, or the representative will remain in the same party he was in at the time
of election - are no more than wishes and expectations. 23 Moreover, there
will inevitably be many decisions and actions the representative is called upon
to make that were not even contemplated or considered by the voter at the time
of his decision. Who, for instance, considered in the 2000 Presidential election
how Al Gore or George W. Bush would potentially respond in the face of an
unforeseeable horror like the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001? This calls to
mind the accuracy and wisdom of the position on representation held by Ed-
mund Burke, that ultimately - though there is of course room for the represent-
ative to listen to the expressed wishes of his constituency and to take into ac-
count any mandate which may be perceived as accompanying his election_24
the voters have chosen to entrust their elected representatives with the indepen-
dence and discretion to make the decisions of policy that are perceived to be in
120 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
121 See Shea. supra note 85 ("One of the dirty little secrets of public-opinion research is the
jaw-dropping apathy and general boneheadedness of the electorate."). This brings to mind the
quote attributed to Gore Vidal: "Fifty percent of people won't vote, and fifty percent don't read
newspapers. I hope it's the same fifty percent." Gore Vidal Infosite. http://gorevidal.net/more.html
(last visited on Mar. 1, 2010).
122 See FLANIGAN & ZINGALE, supra note 79, at 197 204.
123 See MANIN, supra note 57, at 237 ("[E]lected representatives are not bound by promises
made to voters. If people vote for a candidate because they favor the policy he proposes, their will
is no more than a wish.").
124 J. Roland Pennock, Political Representation: An Overview, in J. ROLAND PENNOCK & JOHN
W. CHAPMAN, REPRESENTATION 15 (1968) ("Even Burke did not contend that it was the proper
function of a representative to act without any consideration of the desires of those whom he
represented." (citing 2 THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE EDMUND BURKE 164 (1906) (Burke
is said to have said about a representative's constituents: "their wishes ought to have great weight
with [their representative]: their opinion high respect; their business unremitting attention."))).
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the best interests of the constituents. 125 That is, the voters assent to put the go-
vernance of their affairs into the trusteeship of the elected representative - they
are, in a very real sense, bound by the representative's decisions on matters of
policy after the point of election, whether the voters agree with such subsequent
policy decisions or not. 126 And this is true, obviously as it must be, even for
matters which were not even contemplated by the voter at the time of the elec-
tion.
Consumer assent to the "unknown terms" in standard form contracts can
reasonably be viewed, I believe, through the lens of Burkean trusteeship in rep-
resentative democracy. We know that consumers do not read the terms in the
fine print. Therefore the terms are unknown to them. However, the consumer
obviously knows there is language in the fine print, and they must know some-
how that there is at least some theoretical possibility that that language could at
some point have legal consequences on their affairs insofar as the transaction
with the merchant is concerned. The consumer has obviously not "assented" to
the unknown terms in a subjective, conscious sense. 27 How else to characterize
the actions of the consumer? He has entrusted these additional aspects of the
transaction to the fairness and goodwill of the merchant. That is, he has chosen
to transact with this merchant, out of all of the other competing merchants in the
marketplace. He has made this decision for any number of specific reasons, like
desirable price, type of item or service purchased, and even the perceived repu-
tation of the merchant. For the rest of the potential attributes of the legally bind-
ing transaction, such as what will happen in the event of a problem with the
product or a dispute with the merchant, the consumer is simply trusting the mer-
chant. He is, if you will, "voting" for this merchant by choosing to transact with
it via the standard form, and entrusting to the merchant the fair handling and
resolution of any disputes that may arise. We can say the consumer is simply
trusting the merchant, because the consumer has chosen not to avail himself of
125 See PATTERSON, supra note 55, at 50. This, of course, is also more complicated than it
would first appear. in fact, there are a number of perspectives which may animate the representa-
tive's actions and at least four different theories have been stated regarding how a representative
should act:
1. The representative should act in support of what he believes an effective
majority of his constituency desires.
2. The representative should act in support of what he believes is in the con-
stituency's interest.
3. The representative should act in support of what he believes the nation (or
an effective majority of it) desires.
4. The representative should act in support of what he believes is in the na-
tion's interest.
Pennock. supra note 124, at 12 13.
126 See MANIN, supra note 57, at 237.
127 Rakoff. supra note 1. at 1225 28. Though. of course, contract law says he has assented
under the duty to read and in a legalistic sense. Id. at 1185.
[Vol. 112
CONSUMER ASSENT
the opportunity to actually learn in advance all of the legally enforceable terms
of the contract, such as by reading it in full or seeking legal counsel. Rather, the
consumer chooses to remain ignorant of the unknown terms, and instead simply
trusts the merchant that these terms will be fairly chosen and enforced should
they be implicated in the future. In reality, the consumer is no more aware of
what future enforcement of the uncontemplated and unknown terms will look
like, than is a voter aware of what future policy enactments of a representative
will look like. In both cases, however, we may say that the assenting individual
has assented to the state of affairs which follows. In both instances, the assent-
ing individual has entrusted the administration or governance of the subsequent
state of affairs to another - the voter has so entrusted the representative insofar
as it relates to the administration of the governmental affairs, and the consumer
has so entrusted the merchant insofar as it relates to the administration and per-
formance of the contract.
And this concept of Burkean trusteeship in consumer assent to standard
form contracts accords perfectly with some of the early academic thought on
consumer assent to such contracts. Karl Llewellyn's theory of such assent bears
repeating:
Instead of thinking about "assent"' to boiler-plate clauses, we
can recognize that so far as concerns the specific, there is no as-
sent at all. What has in fact been assented to, specifically, are
the few dickered terms, and the broad type of the transaction,
and but one thing more. That one thing more is a blanket assent
(not a specific assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms
128the seller may have on his form ....
This "blanket assent" of the consumer to the unread and unknown terms on the
merchant's form is similar to the assent given by voters to the future policy
enactments by their elected representatives. The assent is given in advance, and
it covers and binds the assenter to the subsequent state of affairs, even though
such subsequent occurrences were not consciously contemplated at the time the
assent was given.129 As Robert Braucher stated, "We all know that if you have a
page of print, whether it's large or small, which nobody is really expected to
read, and you expect to agree to it, and you sort of put your head in the lion's
,,130mouth and hope it will be a friendly lion ....
At least one contracts scholar has articulated a theory somewhat similar
to the one presented here, insofar as assent to form contracts is concerned. In
128 K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 (Little, Brown, and
Comp. 1960) (emphasis added).
129 See MANIN, supra note 57, at 237.
130 Robert Braucher, The American Law Institute Forty-Seventh Annual Meeting, 47 A.L.I.
PROC. 485, 525 (1970).
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Randy Barnett's article Consenting to Form Contracts,131 he states that form
contracts are supportable based on adoption of "a consent theory of contract
based not on promise but on the manifested intention to be legally bound.' 32
To illustrate his point, Barnett proffered the following hypothetical:
Suppose I say to my dearest friend, "Whatever it is you want
me to do, write it down and put it into a sealed envelope, and I
will do it for you." Is it categorically impossible to make such a
promise? Is there something incoherent about committing one-
self to perform an act the nature of which one does not know
and will only learn later? ... Hardly. Are these promises real?
I would say so and cannot think of any reason to conclude oth-
erwise. What is true of the promises in these examples is true
also of contractual consent in the case of form contracts. 1
33
Barnett cogently notes that, in such a formulation of blanket "consent" to a form
contract, "[t]he particular duty consented to - the promise or commitment - is
nested within an overall consent to be legally bound. The consent that legiti-
mates enforcement is the latter consent to be legally bound."' 134 He goes on to
compare his envelope hypothetical to the act of clicking "I agree" on a computer
screen, when the terms in the scroll box remain unread. Either way, the con-
sumer is consenting to be bound, even though he knows in a sense he is consent-
ing in advance to terms he isn't actually cognizant of at the moment of con-
sent.
1 31
When viewed from the standpoint of an overarching consent which en-
compasses consent to all the consequences that may flow therefrom, the concept
discussed herein is greatly clarified. In Barnett's concluding remarks about the
inherent nature of such consent to unknown future possibilities, he says the fol-
lowing:
True, when consenting in this manner one is running the risk of
binding oneself to a promise [or other manifestation of assent]
one may regret when later learning its content. But the law
does not, and should not, bar all assumptions of risk. Hard as
this may be to believe, I know of people who attach waxed
boards to their feet and propel themselves down slippery snow
and tree covered mountains, an activity that kills or injures
many people every year. Others for fun freely jump out of air-
131 Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 627 (2002).
132 Id. at 627.





planes expecting their fall to be slowed by a large piece of fa-
bric that they carry in a sack. (I am not making this up). Or
they ride bicycles on busy streets with automobiles whizzing
past them. It seems to me that if people may legally choose to
engage in such unnecessarily risky activities - and these
choices are not fictions - they may legally choose to run what
to me is the much lesser, and more necessary, risk of accepting
a term in an unread agreement they may later come to regret.
36
So, a person consenting to engage in a risky recreational activity is con-
senting to the things which flow out of that - an enjoyable time, a day in the
sun, or injuries or sore muscles. A person voting for a candidate is assenting to
that candidate's term of office and all of the policy enactments and decisions
which flow out of that - whether the voter later regrets, or is happy with, such
decisions. The voter entrusted the representative to make such decisions which
would affect his affairs as a citizen. And so it is for the consumer assenting to a
standard form contract with a merchant in choosing to transact with such mer-
chant in order to buy goods or services. The consumer is assenting to the deal
and form generally (whether unread or unknown), and all of the implications
and results that flow out of that initial consent - whether the results are ones
that the consumer later regrets (e.g., an arbitration clause) or is happy with (e.g.,
a favorable return and exchange policy). Like the voter, the consumer entrusted
the merchant to administer the unknown and unread terms in the form contract
which would later affect his affairs as a consumer.
In sum, then, we can see that the assent granted by a citizen voting for
an elected representative is comparable on some level to the assent granted by a
consumer signing the standard form contract of a merchant with whom he is
transacting. The voter is giving blanket entrustment, in a Burkean sense, to the
representative to carry on his affairs in the administration of government and
enactment of policy. This is so, even though the voter may not know - and in
fact often cannot know - in advance all of the actions that the representative
may take or even what situations will confront the representative during his time
in office. Thus, the voter who voted for George W. Bush in 2000 gave valid
consent to Bush to govern, even though it turned out that Bush took aggressive
actions against Iraq, and even though the voter objects to these actions because
he happens to be an absolute pacifist. The assent is blanket, and given in ad-
vance. And so it is true for the assent given by a consumer to a standard form
contract. Such assent is legally enforceable, and is blanket, and is given in ad-
vance. The consumer is entrusting the fair administration and performance of
the contract in many respects to the merchant. Thus, the consumer who pur-
chased a good from a merchant by form contract is bound by all the terms of the
contract, even, say, the limitation of remedies contained in the contract which
136 Id.
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limits the consumer to repair or replacement of the good and prevents any action
for damages. 137 The assent to the form contract covers assent to this specific
term, even though from the perspective of the consumer it was unknown and
unanticipated at the time the contract was entered into. It is nevertheless nested
within the blanket assent given to the contract generally, as described by Lle-
wellyn.1 38 This is the implication of the consumer's delegated trusteeship to the
merchant - the merchant has exercised its discretion and imposed this term on
the consumer. Consent to the term is therefore encompassed by the consumer's
previous blanket assent to the form contract. And the consumer, like the voter,
is bound by such advance consent. The consumer who "voted" for this mer-
chant may be disappointed, but his prior assent is legally valid, just as is the
voter's assent. The assent can be considered fully legitimate in both instances,
though it was based on a trust which the consumer may later come to feel was
violated.
B. The Binding Duration of the Assent
Once a consumer agrees to become bound to the terms of the standard
form contract, he is so bound. 139 The law says that he has a duty to have read
the contract, and even if he hasn't, he is nevertheless bound even in the face of
disappointed expectations. 140 Thus, take for instance again the consumer who
buys a good or service from a merchant. The consumer knows the price, he
knows the thing being acquired, and he may know the general reputation of the
merchant with whom he is choosing to contract. However, the consumer does
not know that included in the unknown and unread terms is, say, an arbitration
clause. The consumer signs (or clicks) the form contract and the good or service
is delivered. If a dispute occurs later and the consumer wants to litigate after
having attempted to resolve the matter amicably, the consumer is then con-
fronted with the reality of the unknown and undesired (but nevertheless fully
enforceable) arbitration clause. This is a disappointed expectation from the con-
sumer's standpoint. But, the binding nature of the contract and the consumer's
prior assent to the contract means that he cannot evade the contract's binding
obligations, such as in this case the arbitration clause.
And the same is true for the binding nature of a voter's assent to the
elected representative's time in office. Elected representatives serve for fixed
and defined terms. 141 As stated previously, there are two primary considerations
at issue in making this so. First, there is the obvious need in a democratic sys-
137 See U.C.C. § 2-719 (2004).
138 See LLEWELLYN. supra note 128, at 370.
139 Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1185.
140 Id.




tem to make the representatives periodically accountable to the sovereign rights
of the people to decide whether to keep the representatives in office through re-
election, based on the voters' appraisal of the representative's political perfor-
mance.14 2 Second, however, is the countervailing consideration of stability. As
stated in The Federalist No. 37: "Stability, on the contrary, requires that the
hands in which power is lodged should continue for a length of time the same.
A frequent change of men will result from a frequent return of elections; and a
frequent change of measures from a frequent change of men .... ,,143 That is,
the orderly operation of government would break down into at best, pointless
inefficiency and at worst, chaos, if representatives could be removed from office
upon the occurrence of any disappointed expectations of the voters who as-
sented for them to serve in the first place. Elected officials need some time to
learn the basics and nuances of the office, to climb the "learning curve" in order
to gain some expertise, and at some point they can begin to govern competent-
ly. 144 If, on the other hand, voters could prematurely end a representative's term
in office based on, for example, a reversal of a stance on an issue, or the change
of a political party mid-term, stability of the government would be greatly un-
dermined. Thus, recall was completely eliminated from the U.S. Constitution,
14 5
whereas expulsion14 6 and impeachment 147 were implemented for very serious
offenses, but the exercise of these remedies has been - almost certainly as orig-
inally contemplated -rare.1 48  Thus, the drafters of the U.S. Constitution wise-
ly ordained basically uninterruptible terms to effectuate meaningful stability in
governmental functioning.
Very similar concerns of stability animate the contractual doctrine of the
binding effect of consumer assent to standard form contracts.14 9 If the consumer
in the hypothetical described above could abandon the contract upon the at-
142 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 268 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed. 1961)
("The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side ...that those entrusted with
[political power] should be kept in dependence on the people, by a short duration of their ap-
pointments."(emphasis added)).
143 Id.
144 See MILL, supra note 97, at 227 28.
145 See CRONIN, supra note 100, at 129. Of course, as was stated previously, some states have
instituted recall of elected state officials. See National Conference of State Legislatures, supra
note 101.
146 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two-thirds, expel a
Member.").
147 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.").
148 Maskell, supra note 101. at Summary (regarding rarity of congressional expulsions); Lau,
supra note 105, at 86 (regarding infrequency of impeachment proceedings).
149 Of course, I recognize that the same considerations of stability discussed herein are equally
applicable to non-standard contracts entered into between two sophisticated merchants.
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tempted enforcement of the unknown and unread arbitration clause, the stability
of the marketplace would be undermined. Commercial activity would be se-
riously affected, because merchants would no longer be able to safely predict
that their contracts with consumers were enforceable by legal mechanisms. 50 In
the words of one court:
[O]ur commercial system depends on the ability of parties to
contract with certainty. Were courts free to refuse to enforce
contracts as written on the basis of their own conceptions of the
public good, the parties to contracts would be left to guess at the
content of their bargains, and the stability of commercial rela-
tions would be jeopardized. 15'1
There are some exceptions which would allow a consumer to prematurely es-
cape the binding obligations of a form contract - unconscionability being the
primary doctrine available for such a purpose. 152 But unconscionability is only
available for unusually egregious terms, 153 and is thus only rarely successfully
invoked.1 54 Therefore, contracts are generally binding for the duration of the
contractual commitments.
Thus, a valid comparison seems to be made between voting for repre-
sentatives and assenting to form contracts, based on the need for stability. In the
context of voting for representatives, the stability needed is that of the orderly
and competent operation of governmental functions. In the context of assenting
to form contracts, the stability needed is that of the safe and predictable en-
forcement of contracts in the marketplace. In both instances, the assent is bind-
ing for the duration of the commitment - in elections, for the elected term of
office; in contracts, for the assented duration of the contractual commitment.
There is, in both instances, some provision made for the occasional, and rare,
150 PERILLO, supra note 39, at 403-04 (citing Stewart Macaulay. Private Legislation and the
Duty to Read Business Run by IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19
VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1966)).
151 St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Duke Univ., 849 F.2d 133, 135 (4th Cir. 1988).
152 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 (2004); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979) ("If
a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable
result.").
153 Meyerson, supra note 1, at 1286 (citing Jeffrey Davis, Revamping Consumer-Credit Con-
tract Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1337 (1982)): see also Barnes. supra note 6. at 248 ("Short of
outright oppression or conscience-shocking terms, courts have been much less predictable in
utilizing unconscionability as a tool for policing terms to which consumers did not clearly assent
and which are otherwise unfair or extremely unfavorable." (citing Hillman & Rachlinski, supra
note 1. at 457)).
154 See generally Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce L. Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability:
An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067 (2006) (providing empirical
data on rates of success of unconscionability claims).
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premature end to the assented commitment - in elections, there are some state
recall provisions, expulsion, and impeachment provisions; in contracts, there is
the availability of extraordinary remedies or defenses like the doctrine of un-
conscionability. However, in neither context are these remedies often used or
successful, with the resultant effect that in both contexts the assent given is gen-
erally binding and thus not prematurely terminable, and this is the case for the
entire duration of the originally contemplated commitment. Thus, once the con-
sumer has "voted" to transact with the merchant of his choice, he is bound for
the duration of the commitment, and reasons of stability dictate this result, just
as they do in the election context. The consumer is bound by his delegation of
Burkean trusteeship under the contract, for the "term in office" of the merchant.
Stability dictates that this be so.
C. Periodic Opportunities for New Manifestations ofAssent
As has just been discussed, neither the voter electing a representative
nor the consumer assenting to a standard form contract can ordinarily terminate
the binding nature of their previously given consent to either state of affairs.
However, the individual autonomy and sovereignty of these individuals is vindi-
cated at periodic intervals, where they are free to reevaluate and choose whether
they wish to undertake further commitments to the same or similar state of af-
fairs, or whether they will instead terminate the relationship and manifest assent
to be bound with another person or entity.
In the case of voting, this opportunity for a periodic manifestation of as-
sent is the election, which is "[t]he central institution of representative govern-
ment .... ,'55 Government's ongoing legitimacy is only derived, under ac-
cepted social contract theory, by government being derived "from the consent of
the governed., 156 The constitutional framers obviously had this in mind, also,
when they stated in The Federalist No. 37 that the "genius of republican liberty
seems to demand on one side, not only that all power should be derived from the
people, but that those intrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the
people, by a short duration of their appointments .... " 15 Tethering the terms
in office of elected representatives to a periodic judgment and review by their
constituency is obviously paramount to the ongoing democratic legitimacy of
our form of constitutional government. Thus, "since representatives are subject
to reelection, they know that they will be held to account .... They know that
their positions will be on the line when, come election day, the electorate deliv-
ers its verdict on their past actions."1 58 Quite simply, if the constituents are not
happy with the performance of their elected official, on election day they may
155 MANIN, supra note 57, at 6.
156 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
157 THE FEDERALIST No. 37. at 268 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed. 1961)
(emphasis added).
158 MANIN, supra note 57, at 237.
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vote him out of office and give their assent to someone else to govern their af-
fairs for the next term. 59 At that point, the voters will get to exercise autonomy
over their affairs, and give assent to another candidate who they hope will serve
them better.
And, again, a similar process is evident in consumers' choices regarding
assent to standard form contracts they enter into with merchants. Once the form
is signed or otherwise assented to, the consumer is bound to the terms of that
contract for however long the executory promises under it remain to be per-
formed.160 However, the merchant with whom the consumer contracted is oper-
ating in a marketplace, and hopes that this consumer (and many others) will
choose to buy goods or services from it when the consumer has occasion to con-
sider entering into future transactions. 161 At that point, the consumer will get to
once again exercise his autonomy in choosing the merchant with whom he will
contract, and therefore what standard form to which he will choose to adhere.
The consumer's prior experiences with his current merchant will obviously in-
fluence whether he will become a "repeat customer," or whether he will instead
look elsewhere for additional goods or services. In this way, the consumer's
freedom of contract and autonomy as an actor in the marketplace is vindicated,
and merchants of course have incentive to perform well in the court of public
opinion and the marketplace so as to garner such repeat customers.
These two processes of periodic assent can be directly compared. A
voter who is disappointed with the performance of his elected representative
"must generally hope that some distant election day will offer an opportunity to
join with other disappointed 'customers' in order to discipline unresponsive
politicians - and signal their replacements and other agents .... ,,62 The con-
sumer who previously delegated his transactional rights, in the manner of a Bur-
kean trusteeship, will ultimately decide whether or not that trust has been vi-
olated with disappointing contract terms buried in the fine print of the form con-
tract, which the merchant knew the consumer did not read in advance, but which
the merchant nevertheless knew that the consumer was hoping would be reason-
ably favorable. 163 To logically follow Braucher's "head of the lion" hypotheti-
cal, 164 the consumer will decide whether or not the lion got too violent with him
or not. If the consumer emerges from the mouth of a friendly lion unscathed,
then the consumer may place his head into the lion's mouth again. But if, as
159 See Levmore, supra note 109, at 569-70.
160 Rakoff, supra note 1. at 1185.
161 See Todd D. Rakoff, Commentary. The Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L.
REv. 1235, 1237 (2006) ("Viewed now as part of a working social system, contracts are assumed
to be the products of competition in the marketplace.").
162 Levmore, supra note 109, at 569-70.
163 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1979).
164 Braucher. supra note 130, at 525 ("We all know that if you have a page of print. whether it's
large or small, which nobody is really expected to read, and you expect to agree to it. and you sort
of put your head in the lion's mouth and hope it will be a friendly lion .... ).
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could be expected on occasion, the lion instead partially mauls the consumer,
the consumer is not likely to have any further contact. No one can deny that the
consumer consented to the risks of putting his head into the lion the first time,
but neither can anyone deny that the consumer has the right not to mess with
that lion anymore.
V. CONCLUSION
Contract doctrine clearly provides that consumers are bound to all the
terms in a standard form contract which they sign when they choose to acquire
goods or services from a merchant who has authored the form, even as to all of
the terms which the consumer does not read and therefore does not know
about. 16 On one level, this is troubling because it seems to undermine the con-
ception of contracting as a fully cognitive, knowingly voluntary activity. On
this basis, it has been greatly criticized by a number of scholars. 166 However,
when the process of consenting to be bound by unknown terms in a form con-
tract is compared to a citizen voting for a representative in a constitutional de-
mocracy, the basis for binding the consumer to the unknown terms in the con-
tract becomes more palatable and justifiable. This is because the consumer's
consent to the standard form is valid, enforceable, and periodically reappraisa-
ble.
The consent to the standard form is valid. Like the voter, the consumer
is delegating to the merchant a Burkean trusteeship of the ongoing administra-
tion of the terms and performance of the contract; that is to say, the consumer is
entrusting the transactional state of affairs to the merchant. He is hoping for the
best. There is, of course, a risk that the consumer will be disappointed by the
revelation of some binding term later in the merchant's performance or en-
forcement of the contract, but that is a risk that the consumer knowingly takes.
This is much like the risk that a voter takes that the elected representative, once
elected and seated in office, will pass legislation or otherwise make policy
enactments which are undesirable from the standpoint of the voter who placed
him into office. But the initial grant of consent for the representative to stand
and serve in the voter's stead is no less legitimate or valid. And neither is the
consent of the contracting consumer any less valid, though the merchant's later
invocation of one or more unfavorable terms is an unpalatable disappointment to
him. Nevertheless, the consumer trusted the merchant as to the unknown terms,
and took the risk, and the initial grant of consent to the transaction is no less
valid or legitimate merely because some of the risks actually come to fruition.167
The consent to the standard form is enforceable. The binding nature of
the consumer's assent to the form contract cannot generally be ended premature-
165 See Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1185.
166 See supra note 6.
167 See supra Part IV.A.
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ly, before the complete performance of all executory promises under the con-
tract. This is akin to the binding, uninterruptible nature of the candidate's
elected term in office. Only in rare instances can a candidate's term in office be
terminated before the expiration of the elected term - as in the limited devices,
where available, of recall, expulsion and impeachment. Normally, the candidate
will serve for the full elected term, as set forth in the constitution or other appli-
cable governing law. And this is needed to ensure stability in the ongoing or-
derly operation of government. Similarly, a consumer's assent to contracts is
generally not rescindable, absent extraordinary and rarely applicable doctrines
like unconscionability. Stability also dictates this result, as the marketplace
would break down into uncertainty if merchants did not have the assurances of
enforceability of their contracts.
68
The consent to the standard form is periodically reappraisable. The
consumer will ultimately be able to exercise some degree of sovereignty over
the merchant, when the contract is at an end. At that point, as an actor in the
marketplace, the consumer will decide whether to transact again with the mer-
chant, or whether instead to voice his displeasure with the merchant (because of
unfavorable terms in the form contract or otherwise) and choose to transact for
goods or services with some other merchant. This, too, is comparable to the
election cycle in the context of voting. On election day, the voters exercise their
sovereign right to determine whether to allow their representative to serve them
for another term, or to instead vote the incumbent out and replace him with a
new representative. The same occurs in the marketplace with respect to con-
sumers choosing whether to be "repeat customers" of the merchant with whom
they have previously contracted, or whether instead to choose to transact by
standard form with a new merchant. This decision will often be based on an
unfavorable view of the terms in the form which were unknown at the time of
contracting, but which became manifested later in the performance and en-
forcement of the contract.
1 69
Seen in this light, and with the benefit of this comparison to the process
of voting for candidates in a representative democracy, the binding nature of
consumer assent to standard form contracts seems much fairer, much more just,
and thus much more palatable than it may otherwise initially appear. Consum-
ers are ultimately exercising their autonomy and freedom of contract by choos-
ing who they will transact with, and by what standard form. They have under-
taken some risk, and have chosen to trust that their selected merchant will man-
age that risk appropriately. They are bound to their choice, which was legiti-
mately given, and will of necessity remain enforceable. But the marketplace
reigns supreme, and here the consumer has a very powerful voice indeed. Thus,
the regime of consumer assent to unknown terms in standard form contracts is at
least defensible, and as a practical matter is quite likely here to stay.
168 See supra Part IV.B.
169 See supra Part IV.C.
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